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STATEMENT OF PACTS
Appellant ROBERT HARRISON, JR. was charged with second-degree kidnapping of
and the jury was so instructed. (Record Vol. 11, p.284.) The district

ten-year-ol

court denied defense's Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at the close of the State's case
but gave the jury an advisory instruction to acquit I-larrison of second degree kidnapping due to
the lack of evidence of intent to conceal the child from his parents, and the court further
instructed the jury on the included offense of enticing of children. (Record Vol. 11, pp.285,
287.); (Tr.p.703,L.10-p.709,L.11.)
estified to the following: Harrison drove by, opened his car door and said,
"Hi." (Tr. p.279, L.3 - 10.) Harrison was insisting tha
get in." (Tr. p.281, L.4

- 6.)

When

get in, saying, "Come on, come on,

got in the truck he said, "That way," and pointed.

he was going to drop something off at his house first. (Tr. p.282, L.5 - 25.)

Harrison tol

When they arrived at Harrison's apartment, he stopped the car and aslce

if he wanted to

go in. (Tr. p.285, L . l l - 15.) I-Iarrison said he needed to put something in the refrigerator and
asked

f he wanted to watch a movie called "Star Trek," to which

eplied, "No."

(Tr. p.286, L.2 - 19.)
then opened the door and got out of the truclc. Harrison told
closed the truck door and walked away. When

"Be good."

was haifway to the street he turned

around and walked back to the truclc and asked Harrison his name through the open truck
window. Harrison replied, "Junior." (Tr. p.287, L.3 - p.288, L.4.)
According to

Harrison never touched him, never locked the doors, never

threatened him, and never bloclted his egress from the truclc. (Tr. p.373, L.6
never testified at trial.
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-

13.) Harrison

During the argument on the jury instructions, defense argued that Instruction 19 (Record
Vol. 11, p. 287.) on enticing of children should include an intent element requiring proof "that the
child shall be concealed from public view." (Tr. p.692, L.20 - p.700, L.5.) Defense's motion was
denied.
The jury acquitted Harrison of second-degree kidnapping but convicted him of enticing
of children. (Record p.293.) Post-trial, the district court denied Harrison's Rule 29(c) Motiou
and Motion for New Trial. (Record pp.301, 303.)

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT ENTICING A CHILD UNDER 16 TO ENTER A
VEHICLE MUST BE DONE WITH THE INTENT THAT THE CHILD SHALL BE
CONCEALED FROM PUBLIC VIEW
A. Intent to Conceal a Child Under 16 From Public View is an Element of I.C. $18-

The district court instructed the jury on the included offense of enticement of children.
Harrison requested the district court instruct the jury on the included element of "intent that the
child be concealed from public view." The district court rejected this request and Harrison
contends this is reversible error.

I.C. 9 18-1509. Enticing of children states:
(1) A person shall be guilty of. a misdemeanor if that person
attempts to persuade, or persuades, whether by words or actions
or both, a ininor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to
either:
(a) Leave the child's home or school; or
(b) Enter a vehicle or building; 01.
(c) Enter a structure or enclosed area, or alley, with the
intent that the child shall be concealed from public view;
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while the person is acting without the authority of (i) the
custodial parent of the child, (ii) the state of Idaho or a political
subdivision thereof or (iii) one having legal custody of the
minor child. Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed to prevent the lawful detention of a minor child or the
rendering of aid or assistance to a minor child.
In this case, the district judge ruled that the "intent to conceal" language only modified,
and was an element of, subsection (l)(c) of the statute. (Tr. p.694, L.22 - p.699, L.20.)
However, the supreme court addressed this issue in State v. Sindak, 116 Idaho 185,774 P.2d 895
(1989).

Sindak was a case involving a child who was enticed away from a travel trailer parked

next to a family home and within its curtilage. Thus, the violation alleged was under I.C. $181509(l)(a), leaving a child's home. Subsection (l)(a) of I.C. 318-1509, like subsection (l)(b)
with which Harrison was charged, does not specifically have the "intent to conceal a child from
public view" language written into the section.

Sindak challenged the statute as void for

vagueness and overbreadth. The court determined:
As noted in the decision of the district court, the statute is not
overly broad. While the statute forbids one to persuade a minor
child under sixteen (16) to leave its home or school. or to enter
buildings, etc, with the intent to conceal the child from public
view, levert the less the proscribed act must be done withoul
proper authority. As discussed in the opinion of the district
court, permission or authority to do the proscribed acts may be
expressed or implied and the burden to show otherwise is
placed on the State.

w,116 Idaho 188. (Underlining added, italics in original.)
While the focus of the court's discussion is on the language "without proper authority,"
the court unquestionably brushes in broad strokes all of the language of I.C. $18-1509(1) in its
vagueness and overbreadth analysis. The opinion specifically applies the intent-to-conceal
language to subsections (I)(a) and (b) - (b) being the section Harrison was charged under - and
specifically avoids delineating the language of subsection (1j(c) (entering a structure, or eiiclosed
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area, or alley) which specifically incorporates the intent-to-conceal language. Further, the court's
analysis is in clear juxtaposition to footnote one, which cites I.C. $ 18-1509(l)(a)(b) and (c) in its
entirety. The clear positioning of footnote one immediately below the court's analysis on this
point makes its meaning unmistakable and its incorporation undeniable.
The clear import of Sindak cannot be mistaken; not only is I.C. 518-1509 not void for
vagueness, but the intent to conceal language found in subsection (l)(c) also modifies
subsections (l)(a) and (b).

B.

Reversible Error.

The propriety of a jury instruction is a question of law over which the appellate court
exercises free review. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002, rehearing denied),
citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 955 P.2d I082 (1998). When reviewing jury instructions,
the question is whether, when read as a whole and not individually, they fairly and accurately
reflect the applicable law.

Id. To be reversible error an instruction must have mislead the jury

or

prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 122 P.3d 1170 (Ct. App. 2005).
When reviewing an elements instruction, the United States Supreme Court has held that in a
criminal trial "the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates
due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement." State v. C o f h , 146 Idaho 166, 191
P.3d 244 (2008), quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 158 L.Ed.2d, 701
(2004).
If this court applies

on appeal and finds that intent to coilceal a child from public

view is an element of I.C. $18-1509(1)(b), the next step is to determine whether the failure to so
instruct the jury oil this element was reversible error. Lillv. s u m . At the time of sentencing, the
district judge made a detailed analysis comparing second degree kidnapping, and its element of
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intent to conceal a child from its parents, to I.C. $18-1509(1)(b), which the judge interpreted to
have no element of intent to conceal a child from public view:
The difference between felony kidnapping, which carries
a maximum 25 years in the penitentiary, and the
misdemeanor enticing that the jury convicted Mr.
Harrison of is whether the State has proof of intent to
keep or conceal the child from the custodial parent. And
Mr. Christiansen says that I've assumed or I've
characterized or I've postured what Mr. Harrison's intent
was. What I did was in the context of looking at this case,
I analyzed the State's proof to see what the proof of intent
was. And I want to restate that the only difference
between 25 years in the penitentiary and a maximum - or
possible 25 years in the penitentiary and a maximum six
months in the county jail is that proof of intent to keep or
conceal the child from the custodial parent.
So what Mr. Harrison's intent was is open to wide
speculation, and that's the only reference that I made. I
never speculated on what Mr. Harrison's intent was, but
what I did do was prohibit the jury from speculating on
what his intent was in order to find him guilty. The State
has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that's an
element of the offense, it's a critical element of the
offense in this case, that his intent was to kidnap or lteep
or conceal the child from the custodial parents, and I
could not find that element or sufficient proof of that
element in the evidence.
So, as far as the evidence showed, the jury was left
to speculate on whether Mr. Harrison was a lonely man
wanting somebody to talk to or whether he had perverse
purposes. As Mr. Cassidy phrases it, is the Court going to
indulge in the presumption of a sinister purpose or was
Mr. Harrison going to get Mr. - or get the child behind
closed doors never to be seen again? No one knows, and
the evidence doesn't tell us.

The district court clearly determined that evidence of intent to co~lcealthe child from
either parental or public view was utterly lacking. I-lad the court given ihe instruction on
enticement of a child with the element of intent to conceal that child from public view it would,
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at a minimum, have had to have given the advisory instruction to acquit as it had also done on
the second degree kidnapping charge. See I.C. $19-2123. By giving the jury the advisory
instruction to acquit with respect to the charge of enticing of children, the court would have been
prohibiting "the jury from speculating on what [Harrison's] intent was in order to find him
guilty.... [because the court] could not find that element or sufficient proof of that element in the
evidence." The trial court therefore committed reversible error by failing to give the intent
element in the jury instruction on the enticement of children charge.
Finally, the trial judge must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the state,
giving full consideration to the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the
evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom; viewed in this light, if the inculpatory
evidence is so insubstantial as to any essential element that a jury could not help but have
reasonable doubt, a judgment of acquittal is appropriate under Rule 29. State v. Hugeins, 103
Idaho 422; 648 P.2d 1135 (Ct. App. 1982); modified on other grouiids, 105 Idaho 43, 665 P.2d
1053 (1983).
There is insufficient and insubstantial evidence of intent to conceal the child from public
view in order to have the conviction stand against Harrison on appeal. I.C.R. 29. Alternatively,
this court should grant a new trial because the trial court misdirected the jury in a matter of law
or, alternatively, the verdict is contrary to law or evidence. I.C.R. 34; I.C. $19-2406.5.6.

11.
1.C. 818-1509 IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS
I.C. $18-1509(1) hils to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence of the
conduct it proscribes and fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. The
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statute is vague in all its applications and is therefore facially vague and void for vagueness. (Tr.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 969
1'.2d 244 (1998), City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 128 Idaho 219, 912 P.2d 106 (1996).
The party challenging the statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that
the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of validity. Olsen v. J.
A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). Appellate courts are obligated to seek an
interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696
P.2d 856 (1985). A statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical interpretation
can be given. City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347,303 P.2d 680 (1956).

In State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003), the court detailed the void for
vagueness analysis:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. This doctrine requires that a statute defining
criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that
does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Village of Hoffman states, Inc. v. Fiioside, 455 U.S. 489, 102
S.Ct. 1186, 71, L.Ed.2d. 362 (1982). It is a basic principal of
due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).
Furthermore, as a matter of due process, no one may be required
at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes. United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841; 847 n.4
(9th Cir. 1986), citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed.2d 888>890 (1939), Smith v.
United States, cell. denied, 481 lJ.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 1964, 95
L.Ed.2d 535 (1987). This Courl has held that due process
requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to
guess a1 the nieaning of the criminal law. Stale v. Cobb, 132
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Idaho 195, 969 P.2d 244 (1998), citing Smith v. Gonuen, 415
U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612
(1974). A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning
the conduct it proscribes, Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d
1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984), or if it fails to establislt minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must
enforce the statute. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58,
103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858-59, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 908-09 (1983);
v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754,756,24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001).
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 71 1-712.
A void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent
vagueness test will be applied if the statute imposes a criminal penalty. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho
195, 969 P.2d 244 (1998), citing Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 497. In order to be successful in a
facial vagueness challenge, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impennissibly
vague in all of its applications.

w,132 Idaho 199, citing Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 498.

If

the statute does not regulate constitutionally protected conduct, or a significant amount of such
conduct, the court must inquire whether (a) the statute gives notice to those who are subject to it,
and (b) whether the statute contains guidelines and imposes sufficient discretion on those who
must enforce the statute.

at 198, citing State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 588, 798 P.2d 43, 47

With respect to the first test of Bin, I.C. $18-l509(l) provides no notice to individuals
that they are violating the law. By way of example, there are several scenarios which prove this
point.
Assume for the sake of the examples that all of the children in these scenarios are under
16 years of age. Also assume that I have no intent to hide these children from public view.

Further assume I am acting without permission fiom the chiidren's parents or other proper
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authorities. Finally, assume that the intent to conceal the children from public view only applies
to subsection I.C. 5 18-1509(1)(c).
Scenario 1:

I wallc down the street with my kids to my brother's house to visit. My

brother and his wife are not home but have gone to a movie. My nephew and niece are home
and playing video games in the house. I invite them to leave the house and come with me and
my children down the street to the Dairy Queen for ice cream. I have persuaded them to leave
their home in violation of I.C. $18-1509(1)(a).
Scenario 2:

I live two blocks from school and have come home froin work early. I

walk to the school at the end of classes to pick up my third grader. I see my next-door neighbor's
son and invite him to walk home with us and have thus persuaded him to leave the school in
violation of I.C. $18-1509(1)(a).
Scenario 3:

1 am picking my daughter up at the mall as the 7:00 o' clock movie lets

out. She has met one of her school friends at the theater and I offer to give her a ride home. I am
in violation of I.C. $18-1509(1)(b), attempting to persuade a child to enter my vehicle.
Scenario 4:

The doorbell rings at my home and I answer it. At the door is a girl who is

selling Girl Scout cookies. It is cold outside so I invite her inside my house while I go to the
kitchen to retrieve my checkbook. I am in violation of I.C. 518-1509(1)(b), persuading a child to
enter a building.
In none of the four scenarios are individuals of ordinary intelligence given adequate
notice concerning the conduct which is proscribed. That is, however, unless the proscribed
conduct occurs with the intent to conceal the children from public view. Further: these are not
strange scenarios with absurd facts; these are common occurrences that happen countless times
eve~ydayin cities and towns throughout the state of Idaho. Literally thousands of people are
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it1

technical violation of I.C. $18-1509(l)(a) and (b) by attending to the common affairs of their
daily lives in the rearing of their children and interacting with their young peers.
With respect to the second test of

m,the mere fact that nearly anyone could be found it1

violation of subsections (l)(a) and (b) leaves unbridled discretion in law enforcement to
criminally charge individuals at their beck and whim without sui'ficie~lt guidelines and
appropriate discretion. Further, there is room for additional abuse of discretion when you
contrast subsections (l)(b) and (c). If a prosecutor charges an individual under section (l)(c) she
has to prove a defendant had the requisite intent to collceai the child within a "structure."
Alternatively, if a prosecutor charges an individual under section (l)(b), she has no such
requirement to prove intent to conceal the child within a "building." This is the epitome of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

I.C. $18-1509(1) fails both tests for facial vagueness. In actuality, to attempt to apply the
intent to conceal language, which is clearly drafted solely into subsection (l)(c), into subsections
(l)(a) and (b), the court would engaging in statutory interpretation that would be strained by any
standards. I.C. $ 18-1509(1) fails for vagueness

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE the Appellant respectfully prays that the conviction be vacated and the
case be remanded to the district court with instructions cogsistent herewith.
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